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The Colombian Experience 
Allen Blackman, Eduardo Uribe, Bart van Hoof, and Thomas P. Lyon 
Abstract 
According to proponents, voluntary agreements (VAs) negotiated with polluters sidestep weak 
institutions and other barriers to conventional environmental regulation in developing countries. Yet little 
is known about their effectiveness. We examine VAs in Colombia, a global leader in the use of these 
policies. We find that the main motive for using VAs has been to build capacity needed for broader 
environmental regulatory reform. Their additional effect on environmental performance has been 
questionable. These findings suggest that in developing countries, VAs may be best suited to capacity 
building, not environmental management per se. 
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Voluntary Environmental Agreements in Developing Countries:  
The Colombian Experience 
Allen Blackman, Eduardo Uribe, Bart van Hoof, and Thomas P. Lyon 
1. Introduction 
The conventional approach to pollution control is to establish laws requiring firms to cut 
emissions. By contrast, voluntary regulation provides incentives, but not mandates, for pollution 
control. The three main types of voluntary regulation are agreements negotiated between 
regulators and industry, public programs that individual firms are invited to join, and unilateral 
commitments made by firms (Lyon and Maxwell 2002). In industrialized countries, such 
regulation has become quite popular (de Leon and Rivera 2010; OECD 2003). Less well known 
is that environmental authorities in developing countries, particularly those in Latin America, 
also have embraced this approach and are rapidly putting initiatives in place. For example, over 
the past 15 years, regulatory authorities in Chile and Mexico have negotiated hundreds of 
voluntary clean production agreements with various industrial sectors (Jiménez 2007; Blackman 
and Sisto 2006). 
Although voluntary environmental initiatives in industrialized countries share many 
features with those in developing countries, their objectives generally differ. Policymakers in 
industrialized countries typically use them to encourage firms to overcomply with mandatory 
regulations; those in developing countries generally use them to help remedy rampant 
noncompliance with mandatory regulation. For example, an explicit goal of the clean production 
initiatives in Chile and Mexico mentioned above was to spur compliance with mandatory 
regulation. Given that voluntary regulation in developing countries is usually a frontline 
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compliance strategy rather than an effort to move beyond compliance, the stakes for its success 
are high.  
But is voluntary regulation likely to have significant environmental benefits in 
developing countries? Two opposing views are emerging in the literature. Some argue that 
voluntary regulation holds considerable promise for poor countries (Dingwerth 2008; Hanks 
2002; World Bank 2000). Enforcing mandatory regulation in such countries is challenging 
because of weak institutions, incomplete legal foundations, and limited political will (Russell and 
Vaughan 2003; Eskeland and Jimenez 1992). According to proponents, voluntary regulation 
sidesteps these constraints because, by definition, it does not depend directly on mandates. 
Rather, it relies on incentives. By spotlighting firms’ environmental performance, voluntary 
regulation can increase pressures placed on polluters by nonregulatory agents, including 
consumers, capital markets, and community groups. Also, voluntary initiatives often subsidize 
investments in pollution abatement.  
Others have pointed out reasons for caution (Blackman 2008; Roht-Arriaza 1997). First, 
as discussed below, many studies find that a background threat of mandatory regulation is a 
major reason firms participate in and comply with voluntary initiatives (Koehler 2008; Khanna 
2001). The implication is that voluntary regulatory instruments are unlikely to perform well in 
countries where mandatory regulation is weak. Second, many of the nonregulatory factors that 
reputedly motivate firms to participate in and comply with voluntary regulation—including 
pressure from consumers, capital markets, nongovernmental organizations, and community 
groups—are relatively anemic in developing countries (Fry 1988; Wehrmeyer and Mulugetta 
1999). Third, because environmental management institutions and private sector advocacy 
groups are relatively weak in developing countries, regulatory processes, including voluntary 
initiatives, are often heavily influenced by private sector interests, a phenomenon often referred 
to as regulatory capture (Russell and Vaughan 2003). Finally, small-scale and informal firms that 
may be less susceptible to regulatory and nonregulatory pressures are more prevalent in 
developing countries than in industrialized countries (Blackman 2006).  
We know relatively little evidence to support such pro and con arguments. As discussed 
below, the literature on this topic is quite thin. Findings from the more substantial literature on 
industrialized countries may not apply because the main purpose for which voluntary regulation 
is used and the institutional and socioeconomic context in which it is implemented are different 
in developing countries.  Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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To help fill this gap, this paper examines the use of negotiated voluntary agreements 
(VAs) in Colombia. After Chile, Colombia is the Latin American country that has relied most 
heavily on voluntary regulation. Between 1995 and 2006, Colombian regulators signed 64 VAs 
with various groups of firms and farms, including five at the national level (MAVDT 2006). To 
our knowledge, ours is the first rigorous effort to evaluate this experience and distill lessons for 
environmental regulation in developing countries.1  
An in-depth evaluation of all 64 Colombian VAs is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Instead, we present case studies of four VAs signed with the cut-flower sector, the palm oil 
sector, the electricity sector, and an industrial association in the greater metropolitan area of 
Medellín.2 We used three criteria to select these case studies. First, we selected relatively old 
VAs to ensure that sufficient time had elapsed to assess their effects. Second, we selected VAs 
reputed to be relatively successful. As discussed below, most of Colombia’s VAs are widely 
acknowledged to have failed, and the reasons, including meaningless commitments and lack of 
follow-up, are well known. We hypothesize that more can be learned by trying to understand 
why a handful of VAs appear to have succeeded than by confirming somewhat obvious reasons 
for failures. Finally, we selected VAs of different types and with a variety of industrial and 
agroindustrial sectors. The case studies are based on interviews with regulatory and private 
sector stakeholders as well as primary and secondary documents. 
We address two main sets of questions. First, why were VAs used in Colombia? More 
specifically, what motivated regulators and industry representatives to sign them? And second, 
how have they performed? More specifically, have the signatories kept their commitments? Have 
the VAs spurred improvements in environmental quality compared with a business-as-usual 
scenario? And have they improved environmental management capacity within the participating 
regulatory institutions and the industrial sector?  
 
                                                 
1 Although several evaluations of Colombian VAs were commissioned by the country’s Ministry of the 
Environment, these were primarily aimed at answering short-term questions (e.g., whether and how to renegotiate 
specific agreements) for domestic policymakers, rather than the more general questions discussed above. See 
Esterling Lara (2002), MAVDT (2003), MAVDT/IDEAM (2005), and MAVDT (2006). 
2 See Blackman et al. (2009) for two additional case studies (of VAs for the oil sector and Cartagena Bay) that are 
omitted here to save space. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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2. Literature 
This section briefly reviews the literature on VAs, focusing on the two broad questions at 
issue in our case studies: Why do regulators and firms participate in VAs, and how have VAs 
performed?3  
2.1. What Drives Participation? 
The literature identifies four reasons that regulators use VAs. First, they turn to VAs 
when they lack the political support, scientific foundation, or institutional capacity needed for 
mandatory policies (Kerret and Tal 2005). For example, Harrison (1999) argues that Dutch 
authorities resorted to VAs to achieve long-term national environmental goals decreed in the late 
1980s because they did not have the expertise to write regulations specifying how industry 
should achieve them. A closely related motive for using VAs is to build the regulatory capacity 
needed for mandatory regulation. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s, Mexican VAs with the 
leather tanning sector committed environmental authorities to develop new regulations, 
management institutions, and waste treatment facilities (Blackman and Sisto 2006). Third, 
regulators use VAs to reduce regulatory transaction costs (Segerson and Miceli 1998). For 
example, Delmas and Mazurek (2004) argue that this rationale motivated Project XL, a U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency voluntary program that granted regulatory flexibility to firms 
with ―superior‖ environmental performance. Finally, regulators use VAs to improve their 
relationships with polluters. Some research suggests that in enforcement-based regulatory 
regimes, firms comply with the letter of the law but do not go beyond it, often developing a 
―culture of resistance.‖ Cooperative, incentive-based regulations like VAs are said to avoid this 
dynamic (Bradach and Kagan 1982; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992).  
The literature also identifies reasons that firms participate in VAs (and other voluntary 
regulatory initiatives). The motive that has received the most attention is mandatory regulation: 
firms participate in VAs to preempt or soften it (Segerson and Miceli 1998; Maxwell et al. 2000). 
Firms also participate in VAs to take advantage of subsidies provided to participants, including 
tax breaks for environmental investments and technical assistance with pollution control and 
prevention (Helby 1999). Third, firms participate in VAs to boost their sales in markets in which 
buyers are concerned about environmental performance (Arora and Gangopadhayay 1995). 
                                                 
3 For reviews of the literature on other types of voluntary regulation, including public programs and unilateral 
commitments, see Rivera and de Leon (2010), Koehler (2008), and Khanna (2001). Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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Fourth, pressures generated by communities and nongovernmental organizations create 
incentives for firms to participate (Blackman and Bannister 1998; Blackman 2010). Finally, 
some studies suggest that in certain situations, firms have a purely private financial incentive to 
participate in VAs because pollution control and (especially) pollution prevention can lower 
production costs instead of raising them, as conventional wisdom dictates (Porter and van de 
Linde 1995). 
2.2. How Have VAs Performed?  
A considerable literature examines the performance of VAs in industrialized countries.4 
Four main themes emerge. First, strong evidence of additional environmental benefits is scarce. 
Based on case studies and an extensive review of the literature (on voluntary regulation 
generally), OECD (2003, 14) finds ―only a few cases where [voluntary] approaches have been 
found to contribute to environmental improvements significantly different from what would have 
happened anyway.‖ In many cases, however, it is difficult to determine whether this scarcity of 
evidence is due to evaluation challenges—most notably lack of hard targets and reporting—or to 
poor performance of the VAs.5 Second, in case studies where solid evidence links a VA with 
improvements in environmental performance, a strong background threat of mandatory 
regulation is usually the driver of these improvements (Lyon and Maxwell 2002; Koehler 2008). 
For example, in a rigorous analysis of six European VAs, De Clercq and Bracke (2005) find that 
good overall performance is significantly correlated with ―readiness to use severe alternative 
instruments.‖ Third, VAs have more effect when they require clear, specific commitments, 
including well-defined performance baselines and targets, timetables, monitoring, and 
enforcement mechanisms (EEA 1997; De Clercq and Bracke 2005; Hanks 2002).6  
                                                 
4 For reviews, see Morgenstern and Pizer (2007), Croci (2005), OECD (2003), ten Brink (2002), and EEA (1997).  
5 For example, a European Commission review of 137 VAs found that 47 had no monitoring requirements, 67 had 
no provisions for verification of monitoring data, and 118 had no provisions for public reporting of monitoring data. 
The report concluded that ―the most important deficiency of voluntary agreements … is the lack of adequate 
voluntary agreement performance tracking (environmental reporting), accountability, and transparency provisions‖ 
(quoted in Harrison 1999, 66). See also EEA (1997). 
6 The literature is not unanimous on the benefit of greater stringency, however. Both Morgenstern and Pizer (2007) 
and Coglianese and Nash (2007) note that rigor tends to reduce participation in voluntary initiatives, which in turn 
will reduce their impact. And both Helby (1999) and Kerret and Tal (2005) argue that ―soft‖ agreements with 
modest goals may be optimal when the main objective is building capacity, not improving environmental 
performance. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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The empirical literature on the use of VAs in developing countries is far more limited.7 In 
general, it highlights the importance of both regulatory pressure and regulatory capture in 
explaining success and failure. Specifically, it suggests that VAs are more effective in spurring 
improvements in environmental performance when accompanied by a credible threat of 
mandatory regulation, and less effective when polluters can block design elements aimed at 
holding them to environmental performance targets. For example, Jiménez (2007) attributes the 
success of Chilean VAs partly to the fact that the agreements complemented reasonably effective 
mandatory regulation and included specific environmental performance targets, clear deadlines, 
third-party monitoring, sanctions for noncompliance, and pollution abatement subsidies.  
3. Background 
Drawn from Blackman et al. (2005, 2006) and Blackman and Morgenstern (2006), this 
section provides brief background on Colombia’s environmental management system, focusing 
on the history of the use of VAs.  
3.1. SINA: Colombia’s Environmental Management System 
Before 1993, environmental management in Colombia was fragmented and weak. 
Regulatory authority was split between a low-level national institution housed in the Ministry of 
Agriculture and 18 regional rural development organizations called autonomous regional 
corporations (Corporaciones Autónomas Regionales, CARs) that collectively covered a quarter 
of the national territory. Lines of authority among these institutions were confused, laws and 
regulations were riddled with gaps, and for the most part, monitoring and enforcement of written 
regulations were negligible.  
Law 99 of 1993 completely overhauled environmental regulation by creating the National 
Environmental System (Sistema Nacional Ambiental, SINA), comprising both regulatory 
institutions and legal mechanisms for planning, coordination, public participation, enforcement, 
and financing. SINA’s principal regulatory institutions are the national Ministry of Environment 
(Ministerio del Medio Ambiente, MMA) and two types of regional authorities: urban 
environmental authorities (Autoridades Ambientales Urbanas, AAUs) in large cities, and more 
than 30 CARs covering the entire national territory outside the AAUs. Generally speaking, 
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MMA (which was later merged with other ministries and renamed the Ministry of Environment, 
Housing and Territorial Development, Ministerio del Ambiente, Vivienda y Desarrollo 
Territorial, MAVDT) is responsible for setting and coordinating environmental policies and 
regulations, and the CARs and AAUs are responsible for implementing and enforcing them. 
CARs, and to a lesser extent AAUs, have considerable political and fiscal autonomy.  
As in all countries, the environmental regulatory instruments used in Colombia are 
primarily mandatory. The principal type is command-and-control regulation, including 
environmental licenses and permits and emissions and technology standards. In addition, SINA 
relies on economic instruments, the most prominent of which are charges for the use of water 
and other natural resources and fees for discharges of water pollution, and on liability-based 
tools (Blackman 2009). 
3.2. Voluntary Agreements 
Law 99 of 1993 laid the legal foundation for VAs. One of its 14 ―guiding principles‖ is 
that ―environmental protection is a coordinated task between the state, community, NGOs, and 
the private sector.‖ In keeping with this principle, the law authorizes MMA to ―establish 
mechanisms of agreement with the private sector to fit the sector’s activities to the environmental 
goals of the government‖ (Article 5, Number 32). 
Following Law 99 of 1993, several official acts laid the groundwork for subsequent VAs 
(Hanks 2002; C. Herrera 2007; Buitrago 2007; Esterling Lara 2002): the 1994–1998 National 
Development Plan and the 1995 Framework for Cleaner Production, both of which encouraged 
the use of VAs; the Clean Production Inter-Institutional Committee, established in 1996 to 
negotiate VAs; and the 1997 National Policy for Cleaner Production, which set forth a national 
VA policy (MMA 1997a). In the wake of those acts, VAs proliferated.  
4. Overview of Voluntary Agreements 
Between 1995 and 2006, Colombian regulators and trade associations signed 64 VAs 
(Table 1) (MAVDT 2006). They fall into three broad categories: national, geographic, and 
sectoral. The first category comprises VAs signed with trade associations representing national 
industries. These were all signed in the three years between 1996 and 1998—that is, relatively 
early in the history of VAs in Colombia (Figure 1). In all cases, MMA was the leading regulatory 
signatory. The second category consists of VAs signed with trade associations representing firms 
in various economic sectors in defined geographic areas. Six such VAs were signed, all also Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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relatively early, between 1995 and 2000. In each case, MMA signed the VA, although in some 
cases, CARs and AAUs were the leading regulatory signatories. The last and largest category 
comprises 53 VAs signed with trade associations, each representing a specific economic sector in 
a defined geographic region. Although MMA signed some of these agreements, CARs and 
AAUs were the leading regulatory signatories in virtually all cases. With a few exceptions, most 
of these VAs were signed in 2000 or later.   
Table 1. Colombian Voluntary Agreements Signed 1995–2006 
Type  Sector or region  Date  Case study? 
       
National (5)       
  Coal  1995   
  Oil  1997   
  Electric  1997  yes 
  Palm oil  2000  yes 
  Pesticides  1998   
       
Geographic (6)       
  Mamonal (Cartagena)  1995   
  Sogamoso (Boyacá)  missing   
  East Antioqia  1995  yes 
  Barranquilla  1998   
  Northern Valley of Aburrá  2000   
  Southern Valley of Aburrá  2004   
       
Sectoral, geographic (53)       
Ag., livestock, agroindustry (37)       
  Poultry (9)  2004   
  Poultry  2004   
  Poultry  2002   
  Poultry  missing   
  Poultry  2003   
  Poultry  2000   
  Poultry  1999   
  Poultry  1999   
  Poultry  2002   
  Pork (8)  2004   
  Pork  2002   
  Pork  2004   
  Pork  2004   
  Pork  missing   
  Pork  2002   
  Pork  missing   
  Pork  2002   
  Hemp (3)  1996   
  Hemp  2003   
  Hemp  missing   
  Coffee (5)  2003   
  Coffee  2003   
  Coffee  2004   Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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  Coffee  2004   
  Coffee  2005   
  Flowers (2)  1996  yes 
  Flowers  2004   
  Rice processors  1999   
  Dairy  2003   
  Mushrooms  2004   
  Tobacco  2004   
  Brown sugar  2003   
  Shrimp farming  2004   
 




  Sugar cane  1996   
  Acuícola  2001   
  Bananas  missing   
 Industry (3)       
  Brick and tile makers  missing   
  Tanneries (La Maria)  missing   
  Electronics  2003   
 Mining (4)       
  Small-scale gold mining  missing   
  Mining (Coquizadorese)  missing   
  Mining (Caleros, Nobsa)  missing   
  Mining (Alfareros)  missing   
 Services (9)       
  Coal ports  2004   
  Service stations  2004   
  Service stations  missing   
  Hotels and restaurants  2004   
  Hotels and restaurants  missing   
  Construction  2004   
  Market plaza  2003   
  Retailer Federation  2004   
  Slaughterhouses (Guadalupe)  2002   
 Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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Note: Excludes 14 VAs (listed in Table 1) for which the date of signing is missing.  
Source: MAVDT 2006. 
5. Previous Evaluations 
MMA has commissioned four reports on VAs: Esterling Lara (2002), MAVDT (2003), 
MAVDT/IDEAM (2005), and MAVDT (2006). However, the main goal was not performance 
evaluation per se but to develop and test a method for evaluating VAs. That said, the evaluations 
(summarized in detail in Blackman et al. 2009) are largely negative. MAVDT (2006) is the most 
recent and most comprehensive. It finds that of a sample of 47 VAs analyzed, only 10—just over 
a fifth—made significant advances in fulfilling their voluntary commitments to improve 
environmental performance. The report identifies 6 VAs that were relatively successful, Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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including three discussed in the next section (VAs with the electricity sector, the cut flower 
sector, and the East Antioquia).8   
6. Case Studies 
6.1. Generic Content of the Voluntary Agreements 
All four of our study VAs were modeled on the first national VA (with a trade association 
representing firms around Cartagena Bay) and therefore are mostly identical. To avoid repetition, 
it is helpful to briefly summarize the common provisions. Each VA has a term of 10 years. 
Averaging roughly 15 pages, the agreements contain seven sections,9 the most substantive and 
lengthy of which lists the signatories’ commitments to: (1) conducting a diagnosis of 
environmental problems in the sector and/or region (in some cases along with an in-depth study 
of a specific problem) and updating it during the course of the VA; (2) strengthening their 
environmental management institutions by creating environmental management departments, 
promoting the adoption of environmental management systems, and launching capacity-building 
programs; (3) promoting the development, diffusion, and adoption of pollution prevention and 
control technologies and developing contingency plans for environmental risks; (4) negotiating a 
deadline for compliance with all mandatory norms; (5) promoting environmental research and 
education by among other things, setting an agenda and holding an ―ecology week‖ event each 
year; (6) promoting international cooperation on environmental management; (7) identifying 
sources of financing for environmental management; (8) establishing mechanisms to monitor and 
evaluate environmental performance; (9) modifying land-use planning to take into consideration 
environmental risks; and (10) developing programs to restore rivers and develop recreational 
                                                 
8 The report attributes this poor performance to a lack of functioning operating committees meant to administer the 
VA, clear environmental performance baselines, well-defined indicators of environmental performance, MAVDT 
support, project financing, monitoring mechanisms, access to technical and economic information, incentives for 
compliance with the agreements, management of obligations in the VA, and continuity in personnel in both the 
regulatory institutions and the signatory companies.  
9 The seven sections are (1) a list of signatories; (2) a discussion of legal and regulatory underpinnings; (3) a 
statement of the objective, usually worded ―… to support concrete actions that contribute to the betterment of the 
public environmental management and to the control and reduction of pollution through the adoption of cleaner 
production and operation methods that are environmentally safe and secure and aim at lowering the level of 
contamination, reducing relevant risks to the environment, and optimizing the rational use of natural resources …‖; 
(4) a discussion of signatories’ (nonbinding) responsibilities and the relationships to other regulatory requirements; 
(5) the list of substantive commitments, (6) a list of organizations represented in the operating committee and its 
responsibilities; and (7) a statement on the duration of the VA, which in each case is 10 years. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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areas. Some VAs include one or two additional generic commitments. Each VA also lists 
nongeneric, ―special‖ commitments. All commitments, both generic and special, are listed in the 
Appendix tables. 
6.2. Measuring Compliance 
To measure compliance, we listed every commitment in each VA, and then relied on 
stakeholder interviews and some secondary sources to determine whether they had been met. 
Detailed results from this exercise are presented in the Appendix. The third columns in Tables 
A1–A4 indicate the compliance status for each commitment: yes, partial, no, unclear. Table 2 
below provides summaries, including the compliance status for the special commitments in each 
VA, for generic commitments, and for all commitments.  
Two caveats are in order. First, as for most VAs worldwide (see Section 2), many of the 
commitments in our four case study VAs were vague, and monitoring procedures were weak or 
nonexistent. Therefore, in some cases, it is simply not possible to determine whether the 
signatories complied. This accounts for the significant percentage of commitments for which we 
conclude that compliance status is ―unclear.‖ Second, our measures of compliance do not control 
for the relative importance of each commitment or for the fact that some were redundant. For 
example, some commitments in the cut-flower VA require signatories to comply with written 
pollution control regulation within a specified time period, but others simply require them to 
―promote‖ community education. The former is (arguably) more important than the latter. 
Controlling for these factors inevitably entails ad hoc judgments and a loss of transparency. We 
have opted for simplicity and transparency.  
6.3. Antioquia Cut-Flower Sector 
6.3.1. Background 
After Holland, Colombia is the world’s leading producer of cut flowers. About 18 percent 
of Colombia’s crop is grown on roughly 400 flower farms occupying 1,500 hectares in the 
environs of Medellín, Antioquia—the geographic area covered by the VA—and virtually all of 
the rest is grown in Bogotá. Almost all Colombian flowers are exported (Isaza 2007).  
ASOCOLFLORES is the national trade association representing Colombia’s cut-flower 
growers. It represents about 20 percent of all growers, mostly owners of large farms. In 
Medellín, where flower farms tend to be small, only about 6 percent of growers are members 
(Isaza 2007).  Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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The three main environmental problems associated with flower growing in Colombia are 
agrochemical pollution, water use, and hazardous wastes. The regional environmental regulatory 
authority with jurisdiction over Medellín’s flower farms is CORNARE, which is widely viewed 
as among the most capable and innovative CARs (Blackman et al. 2006).  
6.3.2. The Cut-Flower VA 
The Antioquia cut-flower VA was signed December 4, 1996, by representatives of 
CONARE, the Antioquia branch of ASOCOLFLORES, and 44 Medellín members of the trade 
association. The signatories comprised owners of relatively large and technically advanced farms 
(Parra 2007). Special commitments in the VA were (1) using the environmental diagnosis to 
develop quantitative indicators of environmental performance within a year of signing the VA; 
(2) creating an environmental protection fund from contributions by signatory growers; (3) 
developing a sector-wide integrated plan for air, water, and solid waste pollution within 10 
months; (4) achieving compliance with  mandatory air pollution standards within one year, water 
effluent standards within two years, and heavy metal standards within two and one-half years; 
and (5) obtaining all environmental licensing and permitting requirements within 6 months 
(CORNARE et al. 1996).  
6.3.3. Compliance and Advances since the Voluntary Agreement 
Of all 33 commitments in the VA, 61 percent were kept (Table 2). Of the 5 special 
commitments, 80 percent were kept, and of the 28 generic commitments, 57 percent were kept.  
In total, more than a fifth of the commitments were abrogated. They included achieving 
compliance with pollution control regulations within a year (compliance was not achieved until 
2003, six years after the VA was signed); promoting lines of credit for environmental 
management investments; and developing recovery programs for watersheds.  
That said, more than half the commitments were kept, including six that were relatively 
important (Parra 2007, 2008; Aristizabal 2007). First, an environmental management fund 
(Fondo de Gestion Ambiental, FOGA)—one of five commitments unique to this VA—was 
established and collected roughly US$60,000 per year from members, along with matching funds 
from government. Second, environmental indicators were developed for solid waste, water 
consumption, and wastewater emissions. Third, a sector-wide pollution control plan was 
developed and implemented. Fourth, signatories obtained requisite environmental regulatory 
permits. Fifth, participants organized roughly 10 workshops per year on different environmental Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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issues as well as an annual sectoral public relations event called Expoflora. Finally, a mechanism 
for monitoring compliance and promoting environmental management was established.10  
Table 2. Compliance with Four Voluntary Agreements:  
Number and Percentage of Commitments Kept, by Type 
Type Commitment  Cut Flowers  Palm Oil  Electricity  East Antioquia  All 
  No.  %  No.  %  No.  %  No.  %  No.  % 
Special commitments                     
Yes  4  80  3  33  5  42  3  38  15  44 
Partial  1  20  2  22  2  17  1  13  6  18 
No  0  0  4  44  5  42  2  25  11  32 
Unclear  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  25  2  6 
  Total  5  100  9  100  12  100  8  100  34  100 
Generic commitments                     
Yes  16  57  13  46  6  21  11  39  46  41 
Partial  1  4  3  11  1  4  2  7  7  6 
No  7  25  6  21  16  57  11  39  40  36 
Unclear  4  14  6  21  5  18  4  14  19  17 
  Total  28  100  28  100  28  100  28  100  112  100 
All commitments                     
Yes  20  61  16  43  11  28  14  39  61  42 
Partial  2  6  5  14  3  8  3  8  13  9 
No  7  21  10  27  21  53  13  36  51  35 
Unclear  4  12  6  16  5  13  6  17  21  14 
  Total  33  100  37  100  40  100  36  100  146  100 
Source: See Appendix Tables A1–A4. 
Certain environmental performance advances in the cut-flower sector coincided with, and 
may have been spurred by, the VA. According to CORNARE, rates of use of pesticides, category 
1 and 2 chemicals, and water all fell by 40–50 percent during the term of the VA (Parra 2007). A 
guide to environmental management in the cut-flower sector was published (ASOCOLFLORES 
et al. 2003). Membership in the VA increased by 12 farms (Giraldo 2007). The FOGA 
environmental fund financed a solid waste incinerator and recycling center (Isaza 2007; 
Aristizabal 2007). Finally, approximately 10 signatory farms obtained ISO 14001 certification 
(Parra 2008). 
 
                                                 
10 In 1999, an ―ambassador‖ was appointed to the coordinating committee to serve as a liaison to the growers who 
had joined the VA. Together with a representative of CORNARE, the ambassador inspected each of the member 
farms at least once per year (and also visited some farms that did not belong to the VA). The results from these 
inspections are publicly disclosed (Giraldo 2007; Parra 2007). Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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6.3.4. Drivers for Industry 
Facilitating regulation. ASOCOLFLORES-Antioquia saw participation in a VA as a 
means of lowering regulatory costs and risks. In the early and mid-1990s, the total number of 
flower farms in and around Medellín increased fourfold (Isaza 2007). This rapid growth led to 
two regulatory bottlenecks. Most importantly, Law 99 of 1993 had mandated environmental 
licensing for all new polluting facilities, including flower farms. But when the cut-flower VA 
was signed, licensing procedures—particularly requirements for environmental impact 
assessments—were ill defined. A second bottleneck concerned municipal land-use planning in 
the congested periurban area around Medellín’s airport where most of the flower farms are 
located. Flower growers considered a VA a more effective mechanism for eliminating these 
bottlenecks than direct negotiations between ASOCOLFLORES and CORNARE because only 1 
of the 17 growers in Medellín belonged to the trade association (Parra 2007; Aristizabal 2007; 
Isaza 2007).  
Market pressure. The VA with CORNARE also was at least partly motivated by a desire 
to improve the image of Colombian flowers in international markets. Beginning in the early 
1990s, environmental, health, and safety issues began to receive considerable attention in global 
flower markets, and Colombia’s flower sector in particular received considerable adverse 
publicity. Germany and other countries initiated schemes to certify that imported flowers met 
environmental and health safety standards.11 In 1996, ASOCOLFLORES responded by creating 
a voluntary certification program of its own, called Flor Verde, accredited by SGS, a Swiss 
social accountability auditing firm. ASOCOLFLORES-Antioquia management saw the VA as a 
means of expanding local participation in Flor Verde (Isaza 2007).12  
The evolution of environmental management outside Medellín suggests that market 
pressures not only created incentives for growers to participate in a VA but also prompted many, 
if not most, of the improvements in environmental performance that occurred after the VA was 
signed. In Bogotá, where growers did not sign a VA with the local regulatory agency, the 
environmental performance of flower farms also improved significantly in the late 1990s (Isaza 
2007).  
                                                 
11 The Flower Label Program (FLP). 
12 Nationwide, 14 percent of Colombian growers were participating in the Flor Verde program in 2007, including a 
disproportionate share of relatively large farms. In Medellín, however, only about 5 percent of growers were 
participating (Isaza 2007).  Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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6.3.5. Drivers for Regulators 
Facilitating regulation. CORNARE management cites two reasons for entering into a VA 
with the flower sector. First, regulators, like growers, were concerned about ill-defined 
procedures for environmental licenses and municipal land-use regulation. CORNARE had begun 
informal discussions of these issues with representatives of the cut-flower sector in 1994, two 
years before the VA was signed. CORNARE proposed the idea of a VA to ASOCOLFLORES as 
a means of formalizing this dialogue. Second, CORNARE saw a VA as opportunity to 
implement its longstanding broad strategy of establishing a cooperative rather than a 
confrontational relationship with polluting facilities (Parra 2007).  
6.4. Palm Oil Sector 
6.4.1. Background 
Colombia is the world’s fifth-largest producer of palm oil, responsible for 2 percent of 
global output. In 2007, 316,00 hectares in Colombia were planted in oil palm and 53 mills 
processed raw fruit. About 40 percent of Colombian production is exported (FEDEPALMA 
2011). 
The Colombian Association of Palm Oil Producers (Federación Nacional de 
Cultivadores de Palma de Aceite, FEDEPALMA), is the national trade association representing 
growers and processors, most of whom are relatively large-scale. It represents 35 of the country’s 
53 mills and half of the area planted in palm oil (Morzorra 2007; Mesa 2007). 
Adverse environmental effects from palm oil growing in Colombia include deforestation, 
water and soil pollution from agrochemicals, air pollution from the burning of crop residue, and 
depletion of the water supply in areas using irrigation. Processing mills generate organic water 
pollution, solid waste, and air pollution (Rodriguez-Becerra and Van Hoof 2005). Because palm 
oil production is geographically dispersed, regional authorities throughout the country are 
responsible for its environmental regulation. 
 6.4.2. The Palm Oil VA 
In December 1997, FEDEPALMA, along with all 51 palm oil firms with processing 
facilities (16 of which did not belong to FEDEPALMA), signed a VA with MMA and with Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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regional environmental authorities for the principal oil palm areas (FEDEPALMA 1997).13 The 
firms that signed represented more than 90 percent of national extraction and processing capacity 
(Morzorra 2008). Special commitments in the VA were (1) developing quantitative indicators of 
environmental performance based on the environmental diagnosis, within one year of signing the 
VA; (2) creating a network to strengthen environmental laboratories within one year; (3) 
quantifying the emissions of signatories within one year; (4) complying with 50 percent of the 
environmental regulations applicable to 51 processing plants by 1998, 75 percent by 1999, and 
100 percent by 2000 (where percentages refer to the difference between the baseline level of 
emissions according to the sectoral diagnosis and the legal emissions standard); (6) establishing 
centers to disseminate information about cleaner production; (7) promoting research on 
integrated pest management; (8) reducing taxes on imported clean production equipment; (9) 
developing written terms of reference for impact assessments and management plans needed for 
environmental licensing; and (10) developing plans for forest restoration (FEDEPALMA 1997).  
6.4.3. Compliance and Advances since the Voluntary Agreement 
Of all 37 commitments in the VA, 43 percent were kept (Table 2). Of the nine special 
commitments, 33 percent were kept, and of the 28 generic commitments, 46 percent were kept.   
Twenty-seven percent of all the commitments were abrogated, including four of the nine 
―special‖ substantive commitments: developing quantitative environmental performance 
indicators, creating a network of environmental laboratories, quantifying emissions from firms, 
and establishing clean production centers. In addition, a major procedural commitment was 
violated: the operating committee for the VA never actually met. Instead, the VA was managed 
by FEDEPALMA (Morzorra 2007; Mesa 2007).  
Nevertheless, 43 percent of signatories’ commitments were kept. Although most were 
procedural, some were more substantive (Table A2). Signatories developed written terms of 
reference for impact assessments and management plans needed for environmental licensing. 
They also conducted a qualitative diagnosis and drew up plans for forest restoration. In 1998, 
FEDEPALMA created an environmental management department and promoted the adoption of 
both environmental management and environmental risk contingency plans. Currently, all 53 
                                                 
13 Two mills were built between 1997 and 2007. The regional authorities that signed the VA were CORPOMAG 
and CORPOCESAR on the Atlantic coastal plain, CORPONARINO on the southern Pacific coast, 
CORPORINOQUIA in the eastern savannas, and CAS in the inter-Andean valleys. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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processing plants have environmental management plans. Finally, the research branch of 
FEDEPALMA developed a program on integrated pest management (Morzorra 2007, 2008; 
Mesa 2007).  
Some environmental advances in the palm oil sector coincided with, and may have been 
spurred by, the VA. There is a general consensus that the environmental performance of the palm 
oil mills improved significantly during the course of the VA. The proportion of mills that treated 
their wastewater grew from 20 percent in 1997 to 100 percent in 2007 (Rodriguez-Becerra and 
Van Hoof 2005; Morzorra 2007; Mesa 2007). At least half of the mills adopted recycling and 
pollution prevention techniques virtually absent in the sector in 1997.14 All 53 mills now have 
environmental management plans approved by their regional environmental authorities 
(Morzorra 2007; Mesa 2007). Finally, a guide to environmental management in the palm oil 
sector was published in 2002 (FEDEPALMA et al. 2002).  
6.4.4. Drivers for Industry 
FEDEPALMA initiated a discussion with MMA about a VA in order to fend off 
―attacks‖ on the sector from regional environmental regulatory authorities, local communities, 
and market rivals (Mesa 2007; Homez 2009).  
Regulatory pressure. Law 99 of 1993 ushered in a new regulatory environment for all 
polluting economic sectors in Colombia. Two aspects of this change were of particular concern 
to palm oil producers: lack of consistency and predictability across CARs in the implementing 
regulation, and rent seeking. Colombia’s four main palm oil–growing regions fall under the 
jurisdiction of different CARs. In the mid-1990s, national guidelines for implementing new 
regulations in specific sectors had yet to be developed, and as a result, enforcement practices 
varied markedly across these CARs. FEDEPALMA saw this situation as inefficient, if not 
untenable, particularly for large firms with holdings in multiple jurisdictions. Second, 
FEDEPALMA was concerned that as the largest and most visible polluters in rural areas, palm 
oil facilities would become the target of enforcement actions aimed at generating rents for 
regulatory authorities. FEDEPALMA saw a VA as a way of expediting the development of 
consistent enforcement practices across CARs, mediating between CARs and FEDEPALMA 
                                                 
14 These include using wastewater from processing mills for irrigation instead of simply discharging it into surface 
waters (50 percent), capturing methane from stored organic wastes and using to fuel boilers (62 percent), and using 
agricultural residue to fuel boilers (Rodriquez-Becerra and Van Hoof 2005).  Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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members when enforcement actions were taken, and preventing blatant rent seeking (Morzorra 
2007; Mesa 2007).   
Community and market pressure. FEDEPALMA also saw a VA as a means of managing 
pressures for improved environmental performance applied by local communities and markets. 
Local shrimp farmers and fishermen had lodged numerous complaints about water pollution 
from palm oil mills (Morzorra 2007; Mesa 2007; M. Herrera 2007). Moreover, in international 
markets during the 1980s and 1990s, concerns grew about the health and environmental effects 
of palm oil.15 As in the case of cut flowers, the VA was seen a means of improving the sector’s 
international image (Morzorra 2007; Mesa 2007; M. Herrera 2007).  
Technological change. FEDEPALMA funds scientific research on palm oil, including 
new methods and applications for improved environmental management. According to 
FEDEPALMA, this research generated win-win innovations—including using wastewater for 
irrigation and burning agricultural residue in boilers—that growers and mills adopted to mainly 
to cut costs. These developments made VA commitments to improved environmental 
performance more palatable (Rodriguez-Becerra and Van Hoof 2005).  
6.4.5. Drivers for Regulators 
Example setting. Although MMA did not initiate the palm oil VA, it had strong 
incentives to sign the agreement (Mesa 2007; Homez 2009). Palm oil was both an important 
economic sector and a highly visible contributor to water pollution. Also, in 1995, MMA had 
signed an agreement with the Agricultural Society of Colombia (Sociedad de Agricultures de 
Colombia), the principal agricultural trade association, to promote environmental management in 
agriculture. As a result, two years later, MMA was inclined to accept an invitation to negotiate 
an environmental agreement from a leading member of that organization.  
6.5. Electricity Sector  
6.5.1. Background 
Colombia’s electric power sector has a total installed capacity of about 14 gigawatts, 
more than three-quarters of which is in (mostly large) hydroelectric plants. Until the 1990s, the 
                                                 
15 According to FEDEPALMA, this growing concern was partly due to a successful international campaign by the 
American soybean lobby to convince consumers that tropical oils were unhealthy (Morzorra 2007). Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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sector was largely government owned and operated. However, severe electricity shortages in 
1992 and 1993 precipitated by drought spurred a sweeping1994 reform that unbundled 
generation, transmission, and distribution and allowed private investment in each subsector. This 
restructuring led to significant new private investment (Uribe and Medina 2004; WWF 2007).  
The principal adverse environmental effects from electricity generation are land-use 
change, water consumption, and disruption of ecosystem services associated with large 
hydroelectric plants, and air pollution and hazardous and solid waste from thermal plants (EIA 
1995). Law 99 of 1993 assigns to MMA responsibility for licensing electricity-generating plants 
(Law 99 Art. 52). However, responsibilities for monitoring and enforcement for both generation 
and transmission facilities are split between MMA and regional environmental authorities, 
depending on facility size.16  
6.5.2. The Electricity Sector VA 
The VA was signed October 29, 1997, by MMA, the Ministry of Energy and Mines, 
several CARs, and 43 private firms, all but a handful of which were power plants, and all of 
which were transitioning from public to private control (MMA 1997b). The firms were not 
represented by a trade association. Special commitments in the VA were (1) conducting an 
inventory, inspection, and evaluation of hazardous wastes associated with the electricity sector; 
(2) establishing pilot projects to test self-regulation schemes like ISO 14001; (3) setting 
voluntary quantitative goals for pollution, recycling, and optimal use of resources based on the 
baseline environmental diagnosis; (4) defining criteria for land-use planning; (5) promoting 
applied research on renewable energy; (6) promoting environmental management on small farms 
around Bogotá; (7) developing a research project on hazardous wastes (particularly PCBs) in the 
electricity sector; (8) rewarding firms in the sector that make clear advances in environmental 
management; (9) developing a database on the electricity sector; (10) defining priority 
ecosystems to be considered in sectoral expansion plans; (11) developing written terms of 
reference for impact assessments and management plans needed for environmental licensing; and 
(12) publishing environmental guides for each of the activities in the sector by the first semester 
of 1998. 
 
                                                 
16 MMA is responsible for generating facilities larger than 100 MW and transmission facilities larger than 230 KW 
(Concha 2008). Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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6.5.3. Compliance and Advances since the Voluntary Agreement 
Of all 40 commitments in the VA, just 28 percent were kept (Table 2). Of the 12 special 
commitments, 42 percent were kept, and of the 28 generic commitments, only 21 percent were 
kept.   
Fully 53 percent of all the commitments of the VA were abrogated. Signatories failed to 
comply with 5 of the 12 special commitments, including the one that received the most attention 
from signatories and regulators: establishing a system of quantitative environmental performance 
goals.17 Signatories also failed to establish self-regulation pilot projects and define criteria for 
land-use planning (Bonilla 2007; Concha 2007, 2008).  
Twenty-eight percent of signatories’ commitments were kept. Many, if not most, were 
procedural, not performance related, however. In 1997, signatories constructed a database on 
firms and facilities in the sector. In 1999, they hired Canadian consultants to conduct an 
inventory and evaluation of hazardous materials in the electricity sector. Starting in 1999, they 
published environmental guides (MMA 1999a, 1999b). Over the course of the VA, they 
organized several workshops for representatives of both the signatory firms and the regulatory 
institutions on environmental auditing, environmental liabilities, and PCB management. Finally, 
according to MMA interviewees, the VA facilitated significant private sector input in the design 
and implementation of regulation.  
Some environmental performance advances in the sector coincided with, and may have 
been spurred by, the VA. The number of plants with environmental management systems 
increased. Air emissions from thermal plants were cut, energy efficiency increased, and the use 
of renewables rose. Finally, devices to prevent birds from being electrocuted by transmission 
lines were installed (Bonilla 2007; Concha 2007, 2008).  
According to MMA officials involved in the VA, virtually all of the advances that were 
explicit commitments in the VA or that simply coincided with it were relatively minor. 
Moreover, although the VA may have expedited these improvements, they probably would have 
happened without it because of increased participation in the electricity sector by multinational 
corporations with relatively stringent corporate environmental management standards, 
                                                 
17 After more than a year of regular meetings, a subcommittee agreed on a list of quantitative indicators. However, 
subsequent efforts to define baselines for these indicators and set up a system to monitor changes foundered (Concha 
2007).  Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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technological change, economic incentives for cleaner production created by the Clean 
Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, and increased use of legal actions to protect the 
environment (Concha 2007; Bonilla 2007; Cadena 2007).  
6.5.4. Drivers for Industry 
Facilitating regulation. In the mid-1990s, regulatory uncertainty created by Law 99 of 
1993 was a particularly pressing problem in the electricity sector. Dozens of new private plants 
and several major transmission projects were being built following the 1994 sectoral reforms. 
Law 99 of 1993 required both new and existing facilities to submit project development plans to 
MMA and to conduct environmental impact assessments as a condition of obtaining or retaining 
their licenses, but terms of reference for such plans and assessments had yet to be developed. As 
a result, environmental licensing involved waits as long as three years. A second problem was 
that transmission companies owned infrastructure that spanned the jurisdictions of multiple 
regional environmental authorities, each of which acted more or less independently in 
interpreting broad regulatory requirements. The electricity sector saw a VA as an opportunity to 
improve the efficiency, consistency, and predictability of environmental regulation—particularly 
for the multinational companies investing in the Colombian power sector for the first time—by 
helping shape new rules and regulations and establishing good relations with regulatory 
institutions (Concha 2007; Bonilla 2007; Cadena 2007; Mendez 2008). 
Low marginal costs. By the mid-1990s, the electricity sector had already made significant 
investments in environmental management, built the relationships needed for international 
cooperation on environmental issues, and earned a reputation as an environmental leader. Hence, 
the sector’s marginal costs of meeting the commitments in a VA were relatively low. The 
sector’s strong environmental record stemmed in large part from pressures applied by the World 
Bank and other bilateral and multilateral lenders that had conditioned loans on improved 
environmental performance (Concha 2007; Bonilla 2007).18  
Politics of privatization. The privatization of the electricity sector in the mid-1990s 
created political sensitivities that favored the signing of a VA. The transfer of control from 
public to private hands—in many cases to multinational companies based in Spain and the 
                                                 
18 Toward this end, the Ministry of Energy, with World Bank backing, mandated that the principal stakeholders in 
the sector form the Environmental Committee for the Electricity Sector (Comité Ambientale del Sector Eléctrico), 
which developed a series of sectoral environmental management guidelines (Concha 2007).  Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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United States—raised concern that private owners would deemphasize environmental 
management. Investors saw the VA as a means of signaling commitment to environmental 
management (Bonilla 2007; Cadena 2007; Concha 2007; Mendez 2008).  
Tax breaks. The Colombian tax code provides financial incentives for energy efficiency 
investments. Part of the electricity sector’s motivation for committing to a system of quantitative 
environmental indicators was to qualify for these tax breaks (Concha 2007; Mendez 2008).  
6.5.5. Drivers for Regulators 
Facilitating regulation. MMA had particularly strong incentives to expedite 
environmental regulation in the electricity sector. It did not want to be seen as creating a 
regulatory bottleneck that would undermine the policy of developing new infrastructure to 
prevent electricity shortages. In addition, it viewed a VA as an opportunity to enhance its own 
capacity to regulate. Under Law 99 of 1993, MMA was newly directly responsible for 
monitoring and enforcing command-and-control regulations in the electricity sector. However, at 
the time, it simply did not have the resources or expertise to perform this function. It saw a VA 
as a means of mitigating this problem, partly by promoting pollution prevention as an alternative 
to command-and-control (Bonilla 2007; Concha 2007). 
6.6. East Antioquia Region 
6.6.1. Background 
Eastern Antioquia was targeted for regional development during the 1980s. Toward that 
end, national and local authorities helped establish a regional trade association called East 
Antioquia Business Corporation (Corporacion Empresarial Oriente Antioqueño, CEO) 
(CORNARE 2008; Ortiz 2007; CEO 2008). Today, 70 of the region’s leading companies 
(roughly 10 percent of all companies) belong to CEO; their businesses include food, timber, pulp 
and paper, chemicals, textiles, services, and flowers (Ortiz 2007; Parra 2007; Tamayo 2007).  
The principal environmental issues in the region are related to manufacturing, namely 
solid and toxic waste and air and water pollution. Food, textile, and paper industries are the main 
sources of water pollution, and chemical plants and wood treatment facilities are leading sources 
of toxic waste (Ortiz 2007; Tamayo 2007). CORNARE has regulatory jurisdiction over East 
Antioquia.  
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6.6.2. The East Antioquia VA 
In December 1995, CORNARE, along with MMA, signed a VA with CEO (CORNARE 
et al. 1995). Thirty of the 70 companies in CEO signed the agreement individually. Special 
commitments in the VA (CORNARE et al. 1995) were (1) defining further commitments based 
on an environmental diagnosis; (2) creating a CEO environmental committee in which all 
affiliated businesses were to participate by the first trimester of 1996; (3) reforming CEO statutes 
to require new members to comply with the VA; (4) establishing a clean production information 
clearinghouse; (5) developing a plan for solid waste management by the first semester of 1996; 
(6) achieving 100 percent compliance with air pollution regulations within 2 years, 100 percent 
compliance with fuel prohibitions within 1 year, 30 percent reduction of water pollution relative 
to baseline levels within 3 years, 80 percent reduction of water pollution within 5 years, and 100 
percent reduction of water pollution within 10 years, plus compliance with environmental 
permits governing soil erosion within six months; (7) establishing a network of air monitoring 
stations to support development of control strategies; and (8) creating a Foundation for the 
Investigation of Environmental Sciences and Technologies. 
6.6.3. Compliance and Advances since the Voluntary Agreement 
Of all 36 commitments in the VA, 39 percent were kept (Table 2). Of the 8 special 
commitments, 38 percent were kept, and of the 28 generic commitments, 39 percent were kept.   
Thirty-six percent of all the commitments were abrogated. They included requiring firms 
joining CEO to comply with the VA, developing a mechanism to monitor firms’ environmental 
performance, and improving land-use planning to take into consideration high-risk areas.  
That said, 39 percent of signatories’ commitments were kept. Most were procedural 
rather than performance based, reflecting the procedural orientation of the VA. Fulfilled 
commitments included completing an environmental diagnosis; for all 30 signatory companies, 
conducting a baseline study in 2003 and establishing environmental management departments by 
the time the VA expired in 2005; developing a program (financed by the Inter-American 
Development Bank) to promote the adoption of ISO 14001 environmental management systems, 
an effort that coincided with certification of 16 of the 30 signatory companies; establishing a 
network of air quality monitoring stations; developing quarterly capacity-building workshops; 
and creating an environmental committee with participation by all 30 signatories (MAVDT 
2005, 2006; Ortiz 2007, 2008a, 2008b; Parra 2007, 2008).  
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Two important performance-based commitments were partially met: compliance with 
existing regulations and acquisition of requisite permits and licenses by defined deadlines. All 
signatories were in full compliance by the time the VA expired in 2005 (MAVDT 2006). All but 
one signatory obtained all necessary permits and licenses (Ortiz 2008b). However, it is not clear 
whether the intermediate deadlines were met. 
Several environmental advances in East Antioquia coincided with, and may have been 
spurred by, the VA. Biological oxygen demand in the Rio Negro fell 57 percent between 1993 
and 2002, and total suspended solids fell 74 percent while airborne particulate matter smaller 
than 10 microns in the municipality of San Nicolas fell 14 percent between 1998 and 2004 (CEO 
2005a, 2005b).19  
6.6.4. Drivers for Industry 
Emissions fees. Colombia’s national wastewater discharge emissions fee program began 
in 1997, two years after the East Antioquia VA was signed. CORNARE led the country in 
program implementation (Blackman 2009). According to CORNARE, the discharge fee program 
led to significant reductions in water pollution during the course of the VA. Ultimately, however, 
it is not possible to disentangle the relative contributions of the discharge fees and the VA (Parra 
2007). 
Clean production center. Medellín’s National Center of Clean Production (Centro 
Nacional de Produccion más Limpia, CNPML), which provides technical assistance and training 
for both regional environmental authorities and private companies, was established in 1998, three 
years after the East Antioquia VA was signed. Importantly, CNPML did not formally participate 
in the VA, and it catered to firms that did not participate as well as those that did. According to 
CNPML directors, it helped improve environmental performance and environmental quality in 
East Antioquia between 1995 and 2005 (Sarasti 2007).  
6.6.5. Drivers for Regulators 
Cooperative relationship with industry. CORNARE approached CEO with an offer to 
negotiate the VA and took the lead (Ortiz 2008a). As noted above, unlike some other CARs, 
CORNARE has pursued a strategy of cooperating with industry (Parra 2007; Tamayo 2007). 
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According to CORNARE directors, this strategy is more cost-effective than a confrontational 
enforcement-based approach and generates results in a far shorter time (Parra 2007). 
7. Discussion 
We now return to the two broad questions addressed by this study: Why were VAs used 
in Colombia, and how have they performed?  
7.1. Why Were VAs Used?  
7.1.1. Regulators 
As discussed in Section 2, the literature has identified four reasons that regulators use 
VAs: to compensate for gaps in capacity to enforce mandatory regulations, to build that capacity, 
to reduce the transaction costs of mandatory regulation, and to avoid creating a ―culture of 
resistance‖ to environmental regulation. Our research suggests that in Colombia, the first two 
motives were paramount.  
As discussed in Section 3, before 1993, the legal, institutional, and political infrastructure 
needed for effective mandatory environmental regulation was sorely lacking. Law 99 of 1993 
was meant to remedy this situation by creating, in one fell swoop, a host of new laws, 
regulations, and institutions, including MMA and 15 new regional environmental authorities. But 
implementing the new regulatory system was highly problematic, for two related reasons. First, it 
was incomplete. Law 99 of 1993 established relatively broad directives. The task of creating the 
more specific rules needed to implement these directives was left to the newly created regulatory 
authorities. Moreover, these rules needed to be tailored to dozens of economic sectors, each with 
its own environmental problems and technological solutions. In the mid-1990s, almost all of this 
work remained to be done. Second, in most cases, the new regulatory institutions lacked the 
technical expertise, data, experience, and financial resources to develop new sector-specific 
rules.  
The result was a set of regulatory bottlenecks. For example, as discussed in Section 6, the 
number of farms in Medellín’s cut-flower sector quadrupled during the mid-1990s, creating an 
urgent demand for environmental licenses. Yet CORNARE, the regional environmental authority 
in charge of licensing, had not yet developed the rules and processes for licensing and did not 
have the data or expertise to do so. A similar situation arose in the electricity sector, which was 
expanding rapidly in response to energy shortages and privatization.  Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
27 
Our case studies suggest that new national and regional regulatory agencies saw VAs as a 
means of managing a transition to the new environmental regulatory regime created by Law 99 
of 1993. The VAs, they expected, would be a way to establish dialogues with industry 
representatives, gather technical information, and build the capacity needed to implement the 
new law. Information gathering and capacity building figured prominently in all the VAs 
discussed in Section 6. All the agreements committed the regulators to conducting an 
environmental diagnosis of the sector and establishing capacity-building programs and projects 
for their staff. Indeed, the palm oil and electricity VAs contained explicit commitments to 
develop terms of reference for environmental licensing.  
There is some evidence that in addition to capacity building, Colombian regulators were 
motivated to negotiate VAs to avoid creating a culture of resistance to environmental regulation. 
In two of our case studies—cut flowers and East Antioquia—the lead regulatory authority, 
CORNARE, had an explicit strategy of cooperating with industry. 
7.1.2. Industry 
As discussed in Section 2, the literature identifies five reasons that industry participates in 
VAs: to preempt or soften the mandatory regulation, to obtain subsidies, to boost sales, to deflect 
pressures from communities and nongovernmental organizations, and to cut production costs. 
Like most empirical research on VAs in both industrialized and developing countries, our 
research suggests that factors related to mandatory regulation were the most important driver of 
private sector participation. 
Our case studies suggest that in large part, industry signed VAs to help fill gaps and 
resolve inconsistencies in the new regulatory framework so that the firms would know the rules 
of the game and be able to adapt to them. For example, the lack of written licensing procedures 
created bottlenecks and stifled investment in the rapidly expanding cut-flower and electricity 
sectors. The VAs signed in these sectors were intended to ensure that clear, certain, reasonable 
procedures were quickly put in place. In addition, in the palm oil and electricity sectors, 
signatory firms hoped that a VA would help sort out discrepancies in rules and requirements 
among regional environmental authorities.  
Aside from plugging gaps and resolving inconsistencies in new regulation, industry also 
expected that signing VAs would help them influence the writing of future rules and guidelines. 
For example, firms in the palm oil and electricity sectors hoped to influence new requirements 
for environmental licensing, and firms in the cut-flower sector hoped to influence new land-use 
planning rules.  Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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Another driver of participation related to implementation of Law 99 of 1993 was a desire 
to minimize regulatory rent seeking. Representatives of the palm oil sector reported that one 
reason they signed their VA was to ensure that deep-pocketed palm oil facilities were not 
unfairly targeted for enforcement actions by newly created regional authorities.  
A final motive for participation related to Law 99 of 1993 was a need to manage the risks 
associated with widespread noncompliance with mandatory regulation. Toward this end, three of 
the four VAs allowed a grace period during which firms could make required investments in 
pollution prevention and control. Only the VA for the electricity sector, where most firms were 
already in compliance, did not include a grace period.  
Our case studies suggest that factors related to Law 99 of 1993 were not the only drivers 
of industry participation in VAs, however. In the cut-flower and palm oil VAs, the industries 
hoped that participation would improve their access to markets. ASOCOLFLORES anticipated 
that the agreement would help recruit farms into Flor Verde, its voluntary certification program 
aimed at improving the image of Colombian flowers in Europe and the United States. Similarly, 
FEDEPALMA expected that its VA would help improve the international image of Colombian 
palm oil. 
Finally, community pressure appears to have played a role in spurring industry 
participation in at least one of the VAs. The palm oil industry hoped that its agreement would 
mollify local communities concerned about water pollution from processing mills.  
7.2. How Have the VAs Performed? 
7.2.1. Caveats 
Most evaluations of VAs tend to be ad hoc and informal. A more rigorous methodology 
would involve assessingthe extent to which (1) the signatories complied with the terms of the 
VA; (2) the VA spurred improvements in environmental quality compared with a business-as-
usual scenario; and (3) the VA improved environmental management capacity (Kerret and Tal 
2005; De Clercq and Bracke 2005). However, the evidence needed for such an evaluation is 
elusive because most VAs lack quantitative baselines and targets, do not require parties to collect 
or report the data needed to determine whether commitments have been met, are implemented in 
concert with other policies, and self-select for industry participants that are already top Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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environmental performers (Kerret and Tal 2005; Harrison 1999; EEA 1997). Unfortunately, all 
of these barriers to rigorous evaluation are present in the Colombian case.20 Given the 
difficulties, our evaluation of the performance of the six VAs is necessarily partly qualitative and 
somewhat impressionistic. That said, three broad conclusions emerge. 
7.2.2. Weak Overall Performance 
Available evidence suggests that based on the three criteria listed above, overall 
performance of all VAs in Colombia—not just the four examined here—has been poor. The 
main reason is that, as discussed in Section 5, most of the 64 VAs signed since the mid-1990s 
have resulted in minimal activity of any type, according to MMA evaluations. Our case studies 
focus on four VAs reputed to be among the most successful. Yet even in this sample, weak 
performance was common. On average, signatories kept only 42 percent of all the commitments 
in their VAs, even though most were procedural rather than substantive (Table 2). This statistic 
ranged from a low of 28 percent in the case of the electricity VA to a high of 61 percent in the 
case of the cut-flower VA. In several cases, important commitments were abrogated. For 
example, signatories to the cut-flower VA failed to create a sector-wide integrated plan for air 
water and solid waste pollution, and signatories to the palm oil and electricity VAs failed to 
develop quantitative indicators and hard targets.  
7.2.3. Questionable Additionality 
Often, empirical studies of voluntary regulation find that advances in environmental 
performance subsequent to the regulation are mostly due to unrelated factors and probably would 
have occurred absent the regulation. Our analyses suggest that this may have been true in 
Colombia. In four of the most successful Colombian VAs, we found that improvements in 
environmental performance were at least partly driven by pressures from export markets, local 
                                                 
20 The VAs are difficult to evaluate because they mostly lacked quantitative baselines and targets and did not require 
collection and reporting of data needed for evaluation. Of the four VAs discussed in Section 6, all deferred the 
development of quantitative indicators of environmental performance and hard targets until after an environmental 
diagnosis had been conducted. Except in the electricity VA, the only important targets included in the VA were 
those related to schedules for compliance. Only the electricity VA and, to a lesser extent, the cut-flower VA contain 
specific commitments to systematic data collection. As discussed in Section 3, Colombian VAs coincide with 
implementation of a wide range of new environmental regulatory tools and institutions, including environmental 
licensing, emissions fees, and dozens of new regulatory institutions, and it is difficult to disentangle the effects of 
each. In our case studies, effluent fees are reputed to have had an important impact on performance of signatories to 
the East Antioquia and palm oil VAs. Finally, selection effects complicate evaluation. For example, in our sample of 
VAs, primarily larger, more technically advanced firms joined the cut-flower and palm oil VAs.  Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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communities, capital markets, and regulators. Pressures from export markets helped spur 
improvements in environmental performance in the cut-flower and palm oil sectors. Both sectors 
were affected by growing concerns during the 1990s about environmental and human health 
effects of commodity supply chains. Pressures from communities and politicians helped spur 
advances in the palm oil and electricity cases. Palm oil mills were pushed by local fishermen and 
shrimp farmers to reduce water pollution. And electricity companies were motivated to improve 
their performance to head off concerns that privatization and expansion would have adverse 
environmental impacts. Pressures from multilateral and bilateral lenders such as the World Bank 
and the Inter-American Development Bank encouraged companies that signed the electricity VA 
to improve their environmental performance. Finally, as discussed above, VAs were a small 
component of a sweeping regulatory overhaul ushered in by Law 99 of 1993, and other elements 
of the new regulatory regime, notably wastewater emissions fees and more stringent monitoring 
and enforcement of all types of mandatory regulation, undoubtedly spurred investments in 
pollution prevention and control.  
7.2.4. Capacity Building 
As discussed in Section 7.1, for both regulators and industry, probably the most important 
motive for participating in VAs was to manage a transition to the new regulatory regime created 
by Law 99 of 1993 by facilitating exchanges of information between regulators and industry 
representatives, building environmental management expertise in regulatory agencies and the 
private sector, filling gaps and resolving inconsistencies in new regulations, and limiting rent 
seeking. Hence, broadly speaking, in the view of the signatories to the VAs, their paramount goal 
was building environmental regulatory capacity, not improving environmental performance. 
How have the VAs fared in this regard? 
Clearly, VAs that were abandoned early on or that spurred little activity of any kind could 
not have significantly improved regulatory capacity. However, our case studies suggest that at 
least the apparently more successful VAs may indeed have helped build regulatory capacity. In 
each of the three sectoral VAs (cut flowers, palm oil, and electricity), at least one guide to 
environmental management was published. In all four VAs, a study diagnosing environmental 
issues was completed. In two VAs (palm oil and electricity), terms of reference for licensing 
procedures were published. All 30 companies that signed the East Antioquia VA established 
environmental management departments, and 16 companies obtained ISO 14001 certification. 
Interviews with national and regional stakeholders indicate that many of the changes would have 
happened regardless, but that the VAs hastened them.  
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8. Conclusion 
To understand why VAs were used in Colombia and how well they performed, we have 
reviewed the literature on VAs, described the Colombian historical and institutional context, 
presented basic data on all 64 VAs signed before 2007, very briefly summarized previous 
evaluations of these VAs, and presented four in-depth case studies of relatively successful VAs. 
We found that although regulators and industry had various motives for signing VAs, in our case 
studies, the most important had to do with managing a transition from the ill-defined, lax 
environmental regulatory system that existed prior to 1993 to the more structured and stringent 
regime created by Law 99. As for the performance of the VAs, the evidence we have assembled 
supports three broad conclusions: the overall performance of the 64 VAs signed in Colombia 
between 1995 and 2006 was poor; even in cases where environmental performance improved 
after a VA was signed, additionality was limited; and consistent with signatories’ motives for 
participating, the most significant benefit of the VAs probably has been to help build 
environmental management capacity in both regulatory institutions and the private sector. 
What are the implications of these findings for environmental regulatory policy in 
developing countries? In the Introduction, we reviewed arguments for and against the use of 
voluntary regulation in developing countries. On one hand, voluntary regulation may be able to 
sidestep well-known barriers to mandatory environmental regulation in developing countries by 
amplifying nonregulatory pressures for pollution control. Also, it may help build capacity in 
environmental regulatory institutions and in the private sector. But on the other hand, voluntary 
regulation may actually require a strong background threat of mandatory regulation to be 
effective and may founder in countries where nonregulatory pressures for pollution control are 
weak, regulatory capture is common, and many firms are small. The Colombian experience 
supports arguments on both sides. Evidence suggests that VAs had minimal direct effects on 
environmental performance, for many of the reasons highlighted by pessimists. That said, the 
VAs helped build capacity. Moreover, it was capacity building, not improved environmental 
performance, that was paramount in the eyes of the participants. Hence, the Colombian 
experience suggests that the most appropriate role for VAs in developing countries may be to 
build environmental management capacity, not to improve industry performance per se.  
The tension between capacity building and environmental performance merits additional 
comment. Although we have argued that the Colombian VAs’ principal benefit was capacity 
building and that it was precisely this benefit that spurred industry and regulators to participate, 
many stakeholders in both the public and the private sectors expected the VAs would improve 
environmental performance. Evidence of the latter view includes the four MMA-sponsored Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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reviews of the Colombian VAs, which focus on the effects on environmental performance; the 
agreements themselves, which mostly describe activities aimed at improving environmental 
performance (e.g., promoting clean technological change); and the underlying policy and legal 
documents, which also highlight environmental performance (e.g., the 1995 Framework for 
Cleaner Production). Hence, there appears to have been a disconnect between the effect that most 
hoped the VAs would have, and the effect that they actually had. It is not hard to imagine how 
this disconnect arose. Many policies with a less direct connection to environmental quality—for 
example, ethanol subsidies in the United States—are ―sold‖ on the basis of their green impacts, 
whether or not these impacts are the true motive or are likely to be significant. 
Whatever its origins, the disconnect between the expected and actual benefits of 
Colombian VAs was costly. It likely contributed to the proliferation of VAs in Colombia in the 
late 1990s, growing disillusionment with VAs several years later, and the current confusion 
about whether and how to continue the policy. In short, unrealistic expectations about the 
benefits may have contributed to a misallocation of scarce regulatory and political resources to 
VAs. The broad lesson for environmental management in developing countries is that, although 
VAs may have significant benefits—namely capacity building—it is important that these 
benefits not be oversold or misrepresented. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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Appendix: Compliance with Colombian Voluntary Agreements 
Table A1. Compliance with Cut-Flower Voluntary Agreement 
CATEGORY  COMMITMENT  COMPLIANCE?  NOTES 
SPECIAL COMMITMENTS     
1. Environmental diagnosis     
 
S1.1. Use the environmental diagnosis to develop quantitative indicators within 
1 year. 
Yes   
 
S2.1. Create an environmental protection fund from contributions by signatory 
firms. 
Yes  Fondo Gestion Ambiental (FOGA) 
was created in 2000. 
3. Production processes     
 
S3.1. Develop a sector-wide integrated plan for air, water, and solid waste 
pollution within 10 months. 
Yes   
4. Legal and technical norms     
 
S4.1. Achieve compliance with the environmental regulations according to the 
following schedule: air pollution standards within 1 year; water effluent 
combined loads standards (governing biological oxygen demand, chemical 
oxygen demand, and suspended solids) within 2 years; heavy metal standards 
within 2.5 years 
Partial  Full compliance was achieved in 
2003. 
 
S4.2. Obtain all required environmental licenses and permits within 6 months.  Yes  Permits only; licenses are not needed 
in the flower sector. 
GENERIC COMMITMENTS     
1. Environmental diagnosis     
 
1.1. Conduct a study of environmental problems in the relevant sector or region, 
or validate an already-completed study. 
Yes  An analysis of the impact of 
agrochemicals on soil and water 
quality, based on a random sample of 
10 companies (3 big, 3 medium, 4 
small), was conducted in the first year 
of the VA. 
 
1.2. Conduct a complementary study of a specific problem or a study to provide 
a baseline for quantitative commitments. 
No   
  1.3. Update the diagnosis during the term of the VA.  No  Updated in 2007 after the VA expired. 
2. Institutional strengthening     
 
2.1. Create an environmental management department in the trade association 
and/or individual firms 
Yes  All participating companies were 
required to have staff responsible for 
environmental affairs.  
 
2.2. Promote the adoption of environmental codes of conduct and environmental 
management systems by signatory firms. 
Yes  During the VA, approximately 10 
participating companies obtained ISO 
14001 certification. 
 
2.3. Develop capacity-building programs and projects for the professional staff 
of regulatory institutions and/or signatory firms. 
Yes  With FOGA funding, participants 
have organized roughly 10 workshops 
per year on environmental issues. 
3. Production processes     
 
3.1. Promote the development, domestic and international transfer, and adoption 
of pollution prevention techniques. 
Unclear  International best practices used to 
develop sectoral environmental guide, 
which was published in 2000. 
  3.2. Promote increased use of pollution control devices.  Partial    
  3.3. Promote water conservation.  Unclear   
  3.4. Develop contingency plans for environmental risks.  Yes  In 2002. 
4. Legal and technical norms     
 
4.1. Comply with specified norms in a specified time period.  No  See special commitment: compliance 
not achieved until 2003. 
 
4.2. Obtain all requisite licenses and permits.  Yes  Permits only; licenses are not needed 
in the flower sector. 
 
4.3. Substitute out of fuel sources prohibited by law.  Unclear  Roughly 10 companies substituted 
natural gas for crude oil in boilers 
used in sterilization process.  
 
4.4. Use only licensed providers and transporters of production inputs.  Unclear  Such licensing is not required in the 
flower sector. 
  4.5. Respect compliance plans already negotiated with the regulator.  Yes   
 
4.6. Facilitate private sector input into the design and implementation of new 
regulations and the revision of old ones. 
Yes  Members of ASOCOLFLORES 
regularly meet with CORNARE to 
discuss new regulations promulgated Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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by the national government. 
5. Education and research     
 
5.1. Establish an annual agenda for capacity building among private firms.  Yes  With FOGA funding, participants 
have organized roughly 10 workshops 
per year on environmental issues. 
 
5.2. Promote interactions with, and relevant research at, local universities.  Yes  Collaborations with regional 
universities include the Catholic 
University of East Antioquia 
(diagnosis of air and water 
contamination) and the University of 
Antioquia (study of sewage 
treatment). 
 
5.3. Participate in an annual ―ecology week‖ educational event.  Yes  VA impacts are presented in a yearly 
sectoral event called Expoflora. 
 
5.4. Promote educational programs and projects in local communities.  Yes  Participating companies develop 
activities with the families of their 
employees as part of their corporate 
social responsibility programs. 
 
5.5. Establish or strengthen local clean technology centers.  Yes  A National Cleaner Production Center 
was founded in 1998. 
ASOCOLFLORES has been on its 
board since then.  
       
 
6. International cooperation 
   
 
6.1. Promote the exchange of information with international institutions and 
firms. 
No   
7. Financing     
 
7.1. Create economic incentives for firms to adopt cleaner technologies.  Yes  Fondo Gestion Ambiental (FOGA) 
was created in 2000. 
 
7.2. Promote lines of credit to facilitate the adoption of clean technologies.  No  The National Cleaner Production 
Center offers ―green credits.‖ 
However, they are not specific to this 
VA. 
 
7.3. Identify sources of finance for the activities in the VA.  Yes  Fondo Gestion Ambiental (FOGA) 
was created in 2000. 
       
8. Monitoring and evaluation     
 
8.1. Formulate and implement mechanisms to monitor and evaluate 
environmental performance. 
Yes  In 1999, an ―ambassador‖ was 
appointed to the operating committee. 
Together with a representative of 
CORNARE, the ambassador inspects 
each signatory farm at least once per 
year and also visits some that are not 
signatories. 
9. Special management zones     
 
9.1. Take into consideration floodplains and other high-risk zones in land-use 
decisions. 
No   
 
9.2. Develop programs and projects to recover rivers and riverbanks and 
develop recreational areas. 
No   
aNumbering of special commitments matches numbering of generic commitments. 
Source: Parra 2008 unless otherwise noted. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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Table A2. Compliance with Palm Oil Voluntary Agreement 
CATEGORY  COMMITMENT  COMPLIANCE?  NOTES 
SPECIAL Commitments     
1. Environmental diagnosis     
 
S1.1. Develop a set of quantitative indicators of environmental 
performance based on the environmental diagnosis within 1 year.  
No   
2. Institutional strengthening     
 
S2.1. Create a network to strengthen environmental laboratories in the 
covered regions within 1 year. 
No   
4. Legal and technical norms     
  S4.1. Quantify the emissions of firms and farms within 1 year.  No   
 
S4.2. Comply with environmental regulations applicable to 51 processing 
plants according to the following schedule: 50% by 1998; 75% by 1999; 
100% by 2000 (percentages refer to the difference between the baseline 
level of emissions in sectoral diagnosis and the legal emissions standard). 
Partial  Industries began to comply only after 2000. 
Full compliance was achieved by 2004. 
5. Education and research     
  S5.1. Establish centers for information about cleaner production.  No   
 
S5.2. Promote research on integrated pest management.  Yes  CENIPALMA, the palm oil research center 
affiliated with FEDEPALMA, has a program 
on integrated pest management. 
7. Financing     
 
S7.1. Reduce taxes on imported equipment that contributes to cleaner 
production. 
Partial  The government approved a sales tax 
exemption on imported clean technology, but 
it was for all sectors, not just palm oil. 
10. TORS       
 
S10.1. Develop written terms of reference for impact assessments and 
management plans needed for environmental licensing. 
Yes   
  S10.2. Develop plans for forest restoration.  Yes   
GENERIC COMMITMENTS     
1. Environmental diagnosis     
 
1.1. Conduct a study of environmental problems in the relevant sector or 
region, or validate an already-completed study. 
Yes  In 2000, a qualitative diagnosis was 
conducted. 
 
1.2. Conduct a complementary study of a specific problem or a study to 
provide a baseline for quantitative commitments. 
Unclear   
 
1.3. Update the diagnosis during the term of the VA.  No  According to FEDEPALMA, there was no 
need for an update. 
2. Institutional strengthening     
 
2.1. Create an environmental management department in the trade 
association and/or individual firms 
Yes  FEDEPALMA created an environmental 
management department in 1998. 
 
2.2. Promote the adoption of environmental codes of conduct and 
environmental management systems by signatory firms. 
Yes  All 51 processing plants now have 
environmental management plans approved 
by regional environmental authorities. 
 
2.3. Develop capacity-building programs and projects for the professional 
staff of regulatory institutions and/or signatory firms. 
Partial  No activities were developed with regulators 
because ―government officials change very 
frequently.‖  
3. Production processes     
 
3.1. Promote the development, domestic and international transfer, and 
adoption of pollution prevention techniques. 
Yes  FEDEPALMA’s Environmental Unit 
promotes the adoption of clean technologies. 
It has a program to train the personnel of the 
companies in several areas, including 
environmental management.  
 
3.2. Promote increased use of pollution control devices.  Yes  FEDEPALMA’s Environmental Unit 
promotes the adoption of clean technologies. 
 
3.3. Promote water conservation.  Yes  100% of the VA signatories use water-saving 
strategies for irrigation and processing. 
 
3.4. Develop contingency plans for environmental risks.  Yes  100% of VA signatories have contingency 
plans. 
4. Legal and technical norms     
 
4.1. Comply with specified norms in a specified time period.  Unclear  100% of VA signatories are complying today; 
it is unclear when they first complied. 
 
4.2. Obtain all requisite licenses and permits.  Unclear  100% of VA signatories have them today; it is 
unclear when they first obtained them. 
 
4.3. Substitute out of fuel sources prohibited by law.  Unclear  Many processing plants are moving from 
fossil fuels to biomass; it is unclear whether 
these fuels are prohibited. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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  4.4. Use only licensed providers and transporters of production inputs.  Yes  100% of VA signatories do this. 
  4.5. Respect compliance plans already negotiated with the regulator.  Yes  100% of VA signatories do this. 
 
4.6. Facilitate private sector input into the design and implementation of 
new regulations and the revision of old ones. 
Yes  The VA facilitates input into the design and 
implementation of wastewater discharge fees 
and water use fees. 
5. Education and research     
  5.1. Establish an annual agenda for capacity building among private firms.  No  Currently under discussion. 
 
5.2. Promote interactions with, and relevant research at, local universities.  Yes  The National University has a graduate 
program in palm oil production. 
FEDEPALMA also has agreements with other 
universities (Unillanos; Universidad del 
Magalena; Universidad de Nariño; Univesidad 
Minuto de Dios). 
 
5.3. Participate in an annual ―ecology week‖ educational event.  Unclear  They are conducted today; it is unclear 
whether they were held in the past. 
 
5.4. Promote educational programs and projects in local communities.  Partial  Some signatories offer training courses to 
local communities. 
  5.5. Establish or strengthen local clean technology centers.  No   
6. International cooperation     
 
6.1. Promote the exchange of information with international institutions 
and firms. 
Unclear  FEDEPALMA is currently engaged in 
international collaborations (a program with 
WWF to assess environmental services in 
palm oil regions and ongoing discussions with 
the Round Table for Sustainable Palm Oil; it 
is unclear what activities occurred during the 
VA. 
7. Financing     
 
7.1. Create economic incentives for firms to adopt cleaner technologies.  Partial  The government approved a sales tax 
exemption on imported clean technology, but 
it was for all sectors, not just palm oil. 
  7.2. Promote lines of credit to facilitate the adoption of clean technologies.  No   
  7.3. Identify sources of finance for the activities in the VA.  No   
8. Monitoring and evaluation     
 
8.1. Formulate and implement mechanisms to monitor and evaluate 
environmental performance. 
Yes  FEDEPALMA contracted with the 
Organization para el Desarrollo Sostenible 
(ODES) to conduct an evaluation of 
environmental performance, which was 
published in 2005.  
9. Special management zones     
 
9.1. Take into consideration floodplains and other high-risk zones in land 
use decisions. 
Yes  A national policy (CONPES 3477 of 2007) 
orders the National Geography Institute to a 
identify lands suitable for palm oil production, 
including an assessment of environmental 
criteria. 
 
9.2. Develop programs and projects to recover rivers and riverbanks and 
develop recreational areas. 
No   
aNumbering of special commitments matches numbering of generic commitments. 
Source: Morzorra 2008 unless otherwise noted. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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Table A3. Compliance with Electricity Voluntary Agreement 
CATEGORY  COMMITMENT  COMPLIANCE?  NOTES 
SPECIAL Commitments     
1. Environmental diagnosis     
 
S1.1.Conduct an inventory, inspection, and evaluation of hazardous wastes 
associated with the electricity sector. 
Yes  Several studies of hazmats were 
conducted, and a guide on PCBs was 
published in 1999. 
2. Institutional strengthening     
 
S2.1. Establish 3 pilot projects to test the applicability of self-regulation, 
such as ISO 14001. 
No  Only 1 workshop on the implementation of 
ISO 14001 was organized, in 2001. About 
10 (generation and transmission) 
companies participated.  
4. Legal and technical norms     
 
S4.1. Set voluntary quantitative goals for pollution, recycling, and optimal 
use of resources based on baseline information in the environmental 
diagnosis. 
No  Indicators were defined, but baselines and 
a monitoring system were not developed 
(Bonilla 2007). 
  S4.2. Define criteria for land-use planning.  No   
5. Education and research     
  S5.1. Promote applied research on renewable energy.  No   
 
S5.2. Promote environmental management in small farms in the Bogotá 
corridor. 
Yes  Two companies (Codensa and Empresas 
de Energia de Cundinamarca) evaluated 
their environmental liabilities. 
 
S5.3. Develop a research project on hazardous wastes in the electricity 
sector, with particular focus on PCBs. 
Yes  A consultancy was funded by the 
Canadian government. 
7. Financing     
 
S7.1. Promote a means of rewarding firms in the sector that make clear 
advances in environmental management. 
No  The only economic incentive was a tax 
exemption for importing clean technology. 
However, it was a general exemption for 
all sectors. 
8. Monitoring and evaluation     
 
S8.1. Develop a database on the electricity sector.  Yes  A database with general information on 
the companies in the sector was compiled 
in 1997. 
9. Special management zones     
 
S9.1. Define priority ecosystems to be considered in plans to expand the 
electricity sector. 
Partial  A methodology to plan expansion of the 
sector was developed. The National 
Energy Planning Office (UPME) used this 
methodology, but the companies did not. 
10. TORS       
 
S10.1. Develop written terms of reference for impact assessments and 
management plans needed for environmental licensing. 
Yes  These were completed in 1997. 
 
S10.2. Publish environmental guides for each of the activities in the sector 
by the first semester of 1998. 
Partial  An environmental guide on electricity 
distribution was published, but not until 
2002. Other guides on generation and 
transmission were developed but never 
published (Bonilla 2007). 
GENERIC COMMITMENTS     
1. Environmental diagnosis     
 
1.1. Conduct a study of environmental problems in the relevant sector or 
region, or validate an already-completed study. 
Yes  An environmental diagnosis was 
conducted in 1994, before the VA was 
signed, and was updated in 2001. 
 
1.2. Conduct a complementary study of a specific problem or a study to 
provide a baseline for quantitative commitments. 
No  In 2001, a methodology to develop firm-
level baselines was developed, but it was 
never put into practice. 
  1.3. Update the diagnosis during the term of the VA.  No   
2. Institutional strengthening     
 
2.1. Create an environmental management department in the trade 
association and/or individual firms. 
Yes   
 
2.2. Promote the adoption of environmental codes of conduct and 
environmental management systems by signatory firms. 
No  No explicit activities were undertaken, 
although roughly 5 meetings were 
organized to exchange best practices. 
 
2.3. Develop capacity-building programs and projects for the professional 
staff of regulatory institutions and/or signatory firms. 
Yes  Workshops on environmental auditing, 
environmental liabilities, and management 
of PCBs were held with representatives of 
the companies and regulatory institutions. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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3. Production processes     
 
3.1. Promote the development, domestic and international transfer, and 
adoption of pollution prevention techniques. 
No   
  3.2. Promote increased use of pollution control devices.  No   
  3.3. Promote water conservation.  No   
 
3.4. Develop contingency plans for environmental risks.  Yes  In 1997, the Ministry of Mining developed 
a contingency plan for hydropower 
facilities. 
       
4. Legal and technical norms     
  4.1. Comply with specified norms in a specified time period.  Unclear   
  4.2. Obtain all requisite licenses and permits.  Unclear   
  4.3. Substitute out of fuel sources prohibited by law.  Unclear   
  4.4. Use only licensed providers and transporters of production inputs.  Unclear   
  4.5. Respect compliance plans already negotiated with the regulator.  Unclear   
 
4.6. Facilitate private sector input into the design and implementation of 
new regulations and the revision of old ones. 
Yes  This, the VA’s main objective, was 
accomplished.  
       
5. Education and research     
  5.1. Establish an annual agenda for capacity building among private firms.  No  Only ad hoc activities were conducted. 
 
5.2. Promote interactions with, and relevant research at, local universities.  No  In the scope of the VA, only collaborations 
with business association occurred. 
Outside this scope, individual companies 
worked with universities. 
  5.3. Participate in an annual ―ecology week‖ educational event.  No  Only ad hoc activities occurred. 
  5.4. Promote educational programs and projects in local communities.  No   
  5.5. Establish or strengthen local clean technology centers.  No   
6. International cooperation     
 
6.1. Promote the exchange of information with international institutions and 
firms. 
No   
7. Financing     
 
7.1. Create economic incentives for firms to adopt cleaner technologies.  No  The only economic incentive was a tax 
exemption for importing clean technology. 
However, it was a general exemption for 
all sectors. 
  7.2. Promote lines of credit to facilitate the adoption of clean technologies.  No   
 
7.3. Identify sources of finance for the activities in the VA.  Yes  The Canadian government provided 
approximately $100,000 for improved 
management of PCBs. 
8. Monitoring and evaluation     
 
8.1. Formulate and implement mechanisms to monitor and evaluate 
environmental performance. 
No   
9. Special management zones     
 
9.1. Take into consideration floodplains and other high-risk zones in land-
use decisions. 
Partial  A method to evaluate environmental risks 
was developed. 
 
9.2. Develop programs and projects to recover rivers and riverbanks and 
develop recreational areas. 
No   
aNumbering of special commitments matches numbering of generic commitments. 
Source: Concha 2008 unless otherwise noted. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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Table A4. Compliance with East Antioquia Voluntary Agreement 
CATEGORY  COMMITMENT  COMPLIANCE?  NOTES 
SPECIAL Commitments     
1. Environmental diagnosis     
  S1.1. Define VA commitments based on environmental diagnosis.  Yes  MAVDT (2006). 
2. Institutional strengthening     
  S2.1. Create an ―environmental topics committee‖ in which all signatories 
participate by the first trimester of 1996. 
Yes   
  S2.2. Reform trade association statutes to require new members to comply with 
the VA. 
No  Statute was developed but not signed 
until 2005, after the VA expired. 
3. Production processes     
  S3.1. Establish a clean technology information clearinghouse.  Unclear  National Center for Cleaner Production 
was established in 1998 but not under the 
auspices of the VA. 
  S3.2. Develop a plan for solid waste management, recycling, and reuse to the 
operations committee by the first semester of 1996. 
Unclear   
4. Legal and technical norms     
  S4.1.Comply with environmental regulations according to the following 
schedule: 100% compliance with air pollution regulations within 2 years; 100% 
compliance with fuel prohibitions within 1 year; 30% reduction of water 
pollution relative to baseline levels within 3 years, 80% reduction within 5 
years, and 100% reduction within 10 years; and compliance of environmental 
permits governing soil erosion within 6 months 
Partial  When the VA expired, all signatories 
were in full compliance (MAVDT 2006); 
it is unclear whether the deadlines were 
met.  
  S4.2. Establish a network of air monitoring stations and a center for 
atmospheric monitoring to support development of control strategies. 
Yes  Network was installed in 2001 by 
CORNARE and Universidad Catolica 
del Oriente.  
5. Education and research     
  S5.1. Create a Foundation for the Investigation of Environmental Sciences and 
Technologies. 
No   
GENERIC COMMITMENTS     
1. Environmental diagnosis     
  1.1. Conduct a study of environmental problems in the relevant sector or 
region, or validate an already-completed study. 
Yes  MAVDT (2006). 
  1.2. Conduct a complementary study of a specific problem or a study to provide 
a baseline for quantitative commitments. 
Yes  In 2003, a baseline study of all the 
signatory companies was conducted (see 
also Gonzalez 2003). 
  1.3. Update the diagnosis during the term of the VA.  No   
2. Institutional strengthening     
  2.1. Create an environmental management department in the trade association 
and/or individual firms. 
Yes  According to MAVDT (2006) and Ortize 
(2008), all 30 signatory firms established 
an environmental management 
department. 
  2.2. Promote the adoption of environmental codes of conduct and 
environmental management systems by signatory firms. 
Yes  16 signatory firms were ISO 14001 
certified during the VA (Ortiz 2007). 
  2.3. Develop capacity-building programs and projects for the professional staff 
of regulatory institutions and/or signatory firms. 
Yes  MAVDT (2006). 
3. Production processes     
  3.1. Promote the development, domestic and international transfer, and 
adoption of pollution prevention techniques. 
Unclear  Several signatory firms, including 
Pintuco, Coltejer, and New Estetic, 
adopted clean technologies. 
  3.2. Promote increased use of pollution control devices.  Unclear  Several signatories, mainly in the textile 
industry, established wastewater 
treatment plants. 
  3.3. Promote water conservation.  No   
  3.4. Develop contingency plans for environmental risks.  Yes  90% of signatory firms had developed 
plans by the VA’s expiration. 
4. Legal and technical norms     
  4.1. Comply with specified norms in a specified time period.  Unclear  No violations were reported during the 
VA, but it is unclear whether inspections 
were rigorous. 
  4.2. Obtain all requisite licenses and permits.  Partial  Only 1 industry did not obtain requisite 
permits and licenses. 
  4.3. Substitute out of fuel sources prohibited by law.  Yes  Four companies substituted natural gas 
for crude oil. 
  4.4. Use only licensed providers and transporters of production inputs.  No   Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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  4.5. Respect compliance plans already negotiated with the regulator.  Yes   
  4.6. Facilitate private sector input into the design and implementation of new 
regulations and the revision of old ones. 
No   
5. Education and research     
  5.1. Establish an annual agenda for capacity building among private firms.  Yes  The agenda was an important VA 
activity: 4 events per year were 
organized. 
  5.2. Promote interactions with, and relevant research at, local universities.  No   
  5.3. Participate in an annual ―ecology week‖ educational event.  Partial  Events were held in first 5 years of VA, 
but not thereafter. 
  5.4. Promote educational programs and projects in local communities.  Yes  Activities developed by local firms. 
  5.5. Establish or strengthen local clean technology centers.  Unclear  A National Center for Cleaner 
Production was established in 1998 but 
not under the auspices of VA. 
6. International cooperation     
  6.1. Promote the exchange of information with international institutions and 
firms. 
Yes  In 2003, the Inter-American 
Development Bank provided roughly 
$400,000 to finance ISO 14001 
certification of 27 signatory firms. 
7. Financing     
  7.1. Create economic incentives for firms to adopt cleaner technologies.  No  The only economic incentive was a tax 
exemption for importing cleaner 
technology, but it was not specific to the 
VA. 
  7.2. Promote lines of credit to facilitate the adoption of clean technologies.  No  A green credit program was offered by 
the National Cleaner Production Center 
but was not specific to the VA. 
  7.3. Identify sources of finance for the activities in the VA.  No   
8. Monitoring and evaluation     
  8.1. Formulate and implement mechanisms to monitor and evaluate 
environmental performance. 
No   
9. Special management zones     
  9.1. Take into consideration floodplains and other high-risk zones in land-use 
decisions. 
No   
  9.2. Develop programs and projects to recover rivers and riverbanks and 
develop recreational areas. 
No   
aNumbering of special commitments matches numbering of generic commitments.  
Source: Ortiz 2008b unless otherwise noted. 
 